We present a simpler way than usual to deduce the completeness theorem for the second-oder classical logic from the first-order one. We also extend our method to the case of second-order intuitionistic logic.
Introduction
The usual way (but not the original Henkin's proof [3, 4] ) for proving the completeness theorem for second-order logic is to deduce it from the completeness theorem for first-order multi-sorted logic [2] . There is clearly a trivial translation from second-order logic to firstorder multi-sorted logic, by associating one sort to first-order objects and, for each n ∈ N, one sort for predicates of arity n. Another way (due Van Dalen [12] ) to is to deduce it from the completeness theorem for first-order mono-sorted logic: Van Dalen method's is to associate a first-order variable x to each second-order variable X of ariry n, and encode the atomic formula X(x 1 , . . . , x n ) by Ap n (x, x 1 , . . . , x n ) where Ap n is a relation symbol of arity n + 1. Then, this coding is extended to all formulas.We write it F → F * . However, to allow the translation between second-order proofs and first-order proofs, one adds some axioms to discriminate between first and second-order objects. The critical point is the translation of quantifications:
• For first-order quantification we define (∀x F ) * = ∀x(v(x) → F * ) where v is a new predicate constant.
• For second-order quantification of arity n we define (∀X n F ) * = ∀x(V n (x) → F * ) where V n is a new predicate constant.
Then we add axioms relating v, V n and Ap n such as ∀x∀y(Ap 1 (x, y) → V 1 (x) ∧ v(y)).
The problem is that this translation is not surjective. So it is not immediate to prove that if F * is provable in first-order logic then F is provable in second-order logic, because all the formulas appearing in the proof of F * are not necessarily of the shape G * . It is not even clear that the proof in [12] which is only sketched can be completed into a correct proof (at least the authors do not know how to end his proof). May be there is a solution using the fact that subformulas of F * are nearly of the shape G * and one could use this in a direct, but very tedious, proof by induction on the proof of F using the subformula property which is a strong result. Our solution, is to simplify Van Dalen's translation F → F * from second-order logic to first-order. The novelty of this paper is to replace Van Dalen's axiom's and extra predicate constant by a coding F → F ⋄ from first-order logic to second-order such that F * ⋄ and F are logically equivalent. To achieve this we consider that in first order logic the same variable may have different meanings (in the semantics) depending on it's position in atomic formulas. Thus, we can translate any first-order formula back to a second-order formula.
Using this method we can also deduce a definition of Kripke models [5] for second-order intuitionistic logic and easily get a completeness theorem. This models are similar to Prawitz's second-order Beth's models [11, 1] . This was not at all so clear with Van Dalen's method (as we do not how to end his proof) if we need classical absurdity to use the extra axioms. We also give some simple examples showing that despite a complex definition, computation is possible in these models.
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Coding
Definition 2.1 (second-order language) Let L 2 , the language of second-order logic, be the following:
• The logical symbols ⊥,→ , ∧, ∨, ∀ and ∃.
• A countable set V of first-order variables : x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . .
• A countable set Σ of constants and functions symbols (of various arity) : a, b, f, g, h, . . ..
• Using V and Σ we construct the set of first-order terms T : t 1 , t 2 , ...
• For each n ∈ N, a countable set V n of second-order variables of arity n : X n 0 , X n 1 , X n 2 , . . ..
To simplify, we omit second-order constants (they can be replaced by free variables).
Definition 2.2 (first-order language) Let L 1 , a particular language of first-order logic, be the following:
• A countable set V of first-order variables : • For each n ∈ N, a relation symbol Ap n of arity n + 1.
Notations
• We write F v (F ) for the set of all free variables of a formula F .
• We write
• We write F [x := t] for the first-order substitution of a term.
• We write F [X n := Y n ] for the second-order substitution of a variable.
• We write F [X n := λx 1 . . . x n G] for the second-order substitution of a formula.
• We will use natural deduction [9, 12] both for second and first-order logic, and we will write Γ ⊢ n k F with k ∈ {i, c} (for intuitionistic or classical logic) and n ∈ {1, 2} (for first or second-order).
We have the following lemma:
Definition 2.4 (coding)
We choose for each n ∈ N a bijection φ n from V n to V. The fact that it is a bijection for each n is the main point in our method. Let F be a second-order formula, we define a first-order formula F * by induction as follows: 
. This example illustrates why we need renaming. For instance, if Φ 1 (X) were equal to x or y in (X(x) → X(y)) * .
Remark 2.7
The mapping F → F * is not surjective, for instance there is no antecedent for ∀x Ap 1 (x, x) or Ap 1 (f (a), a).
Definition 2.8 (comprehension schemas)
The second-order comprehension schema SC 2 is the set of all closed formulas SC 2 (G; x 1 , . . . , x n ; χ 1 , . . . , χ m ) where {x 1 , . . . , x n } ⊂ V and
It is easy to show that SC 2 is provable in second order logic.
Remark 2.9 Let F = X(x) where Φ 1 (X) = x. We have:
• SC 2 (F ;
It is easy to see that
In general we have the following result : for each second-order formula G there is a variable substitution σ such that
We can now show the following theorem (we will not use it):
proof: By induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ 2 k A, using SC 1 , remark 2.9 and lemma 2.3 for the case of the second-order elimination of ∀ and the second-order introduction of ∃.
⊓ ⊔ Definition 2.11 (reverse coding) Let F be a first-order formula, we define a second-order formula F ⋄ by induction as follows:
•
Remark 2.12 We don't need renaming in order to define (Qx A)
⋄ since the φ n are bijections. Let Γ be a first-order context, F = Ap 1 (x, y) → Ap 2 (x, y, y) ∨ Ap 1 (y, x) and t a term. We have :
We remark that :
and then :
Lemma 2.17 Let Γ be a first-order context and A a first-order formula. If
proof: By induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ 1 k A. The only difficult cases are the case of the elimination of ∀ and the introduction of ∃ which are treated in the same way as the examples 2.16.
⊓ ⊔ Now, we can prove the converse of theorem 2.10, which is the main tool to prove our completeness theorems:
Theorem 2.18 Let Γ be a second-order context and A a second-order formula. If
proof: By lemma 2.17, corollary 2.15, lemma 2.13 and using the fact that formulas in SC 2 are provable. ⊓ ⊔
Classical completeness
Here is the usual definition of second order models [7, 10, 12] :
• D is a non empty set.
• Σ contains a function f from D n to D for each function f of arity n in Σ.
• P n ⊆ P(D n ) for each n ∈ N. The set P n of subsets of D n will be used as the range for the second-order quantification of arity n. For n = 0, we assume that
An M 2 -interpretation σ is a function on V ∪ n∈N V n such that σ(x) ∈ D for x ∈ V and σ(X n ) ∈ P n for X n ∈ V n . If σ is a M 2 -interpretation, we define σ(t) the interpretation of a first-order term by induction with σ(f (t 1 , . . . , t n )) = f (σ(t 1 ), . . . , σ(t n )).
Then if σ is a M 2 -interpretation we define M 2 , σ |= A for a formula A by induction as follows:
We will write M 2 |= A if for all M 2 -interpretation σ we have M 2 , σ |= A.
Definition 3.2 (first-order classical model) A first-order model for L 1 is given by a tuple
• α n ⊆ D n+1 for each n ∈ N. The relation α n will be the interpretation of Ap n .
For any first-order model M 1 , any first-oder formula A and any
M 1 -interpretation σ, we define M 1 , σ |= A et M 1 |= A
as above by induction on A (we just have to remove the cases for second-order quantification).

Definition 3.3 (semantical translation)
We define a second-order model M 1 ⋄ = (D, Σ, {P n } n∈N ) where P 0 = {0, 1} and for n > 0, P n = {|a| n ; a ∈ D} where |a| n = {(a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ D n ; (a, a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ α n }. 
Lemma 3.4 For any first-order model
Intuitionistic completeness
Our method, when applied to the intuitionistic case, gives the following definition of secondorder models (similar to Prawitz's adaptation of Beth's models [11] ). We mean that the definition arises mechanically if we want to get lemma 4.7 (which is the analogous of lemma 3.4 in the classical case). • D p are non empty sets such that for all p, q ∈ K, p ≤ q implies D p ⊆ D q .
• Σ p contains a function f p from D n p to D p for each function f of arity n in Σ. Moreover, for all p, q ∈ K, p ≤ q implies that for all (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ D n p ⊆ D n q we have f p (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = f q (a 1 , . . . , a n ).
• Π n,p are non empty sets of increasing functions (P q ) q≥p such that for all q ≥ p, P q ∈ P(D n q ) (increasing means for all q, q ′ ≥ p, q ≤ q ′ implies P q ⊆ P q ′ ). Moreover, if q ≥ p and π ∈ Π n,p then π restricted to all q ′ ≥ q belongs to Π n,q .
In particular, an element of Π 0,p is a particular increasing function in {0,1} with 0 = ∅ and 1 = {∅}.
A K 2 -interpretation σ at level p is a function σ such that σ(x) ∈ D p for x ∈ V and σ(X n ) ∈ Π n,p for X n ∈ V n . σ(f (t 1 , . . . , t n )) = f p (σ(t 1 ), . . . , σ(t n )). Then if σ is a K 2 -interpretation at level p we define K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ A for a formula A by induction as follows:
Definition 4.3 If σ is a K 2 -interpretation at level p, we define σ(t) the interpretation of a first-order term by induction with
• K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ X n (t 1 , . . . , t n ) iff (σ(t 1 ), . . . , σ(t n )) ∈ σ(X n )(p) • K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ A → B iff for all q ≥ p if K 2 , σ, q ⊢ ⊢ A then K 2 , σ, q ⊢ ⊢ B • K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ A ∧ B iff K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ A and K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ B • K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ A ∨ B iff K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ A or K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ B • K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ ∀x A iff for all q ≥ p, for all v ∈ D q we have K 2 , σ[x := v], q ⊢ ⊢ A • K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ ∃x A iff there exists v ∈ D p such that K 2 , σ[x := v], p ⊢ ⊢ A • K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ ∀X n A iff for all q ≥ p, for all π ∈ Π n,q we have K 2 , σ[X n := π], q ⊢ ⊢ A • K 2 , σ, p ⊢ ⊢ ∃X n A iff there exists π ∈ Π n,p such that K 2 , σ[X n := π], p ⊢ ⊢ A We will write K 2 ⊢ ⊢ A if for all K 2 -interpretation σ at level 0 we have K 2 , σ, 0 ⊢ ⊢ A.
Remark 4.4 Interpretations are monotonic, this means that the set of true statements only increase when we go from world p to world q with p ≤ q.
We recall here the usual Kripke's definition [5] of intuitionistic models:
Definition 4.5 (first-order intuitionistic model) A first-order Kripke model is given by a tuple
is a partially ordered set with 0 as bottom element.
• D p are non empty sets such that for all p, q ∈ K, p ≤ q implies D p ⊆ D q .
• α n,p are subsets of D n+1 p such that for all p, q ∈ K, for all n ∈ N, p ≤ q implies α n,p ⊆ α n,q .
• ⊢ ⊢ is the relation defined by p ⊢ ⊢ Ap n (a, a 1 , . . . , a n ) if and only if p ∈ K and (a, a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ α n,p .
For any first-order Kripke model K 1 , any first-oder formula A and any K 1 -interpretation σ, we define K 1 , p, σ ⊢ ⊢ A as above. We will write 
be a first-order Kripke model. We define a second-order Kripke model
where Π n,p = {|a| n ; a ∈ D p } with for all q ≥ p, |a| n (q) = {(a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ D n q ; (a, a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ α n,q }. proof: =⇒ Usual direct proof by induction on the proof of ⊢ 2 i A. ⇐= Identical to the proof of theorem 3.6 using the lemmas 4.7 and 4.8 instead of lemmas 3.4 and 3.5.
⊓ ⊔
Examples of second order propositional intuitionistic models
In this section we will only consider propositional intuitionistic logic. Then the definition of models can be simplified using the following remark:
The interpretation of a propositional variable at level p can be seen as a bar: a bar being a set B with
• for all q ∈ B, q ≥ p
• for all q, q ′ ∈ B such that q = q ′ , we have neither q ≤ q ′ nor q ′ ≤ q 
We take a model K 2 with two points 0, p and such that Π 0,0 contains π 1 and π 2 defined by π 1 (0) = π 2 (0) = π 2 (p) = 0 and π 1 (p) = 1 (this means that π 2 is the empty bar and π 1 is then bar {p}). It is clear that proof: [6, 8] 
